Sunday, 21 November 2010

Deconstructing Devolution

The revelation this week – the day after an austere Scottish budget was announced – that the SNP administration has surrendered its income-tax varying power may well have gone over the heads of most of the millions of voters gearing up to give their verdict on the nationalists’ first term in office.

But it is sure to thicken the election plot next Spring. The effect of the move, made within months of the SNP’s victory in 2007 (and the refusal of the executive to reverse it since then) is that whoever wins in May will have its tax-varying hands tied until the 2013-14 financial year – almost halfway through the next parliament.

The reason this week’s revelation was made was a (supposed) concern on the part of the Scottish Secretary, Lib Dem coalition minister (and Edinburgh constituency MP) Michael Moore, of the impact of the unavailability of this policy tool on the Holyrood parties’ election strategies and policy programmes.

Not that the Scottish people can have much faith in those anyway. But the independence referendum promise is a whole other story, for another blog, on another day.

Remember, the power to raise or lower by 3p in the pound the income tax paid by Scottish taxpayers to fund Scottish services was deemed such a significant aspect of the devolution project as to be the subject of a second question on the referendum ballot paper in 1998.

Alex Salmond prominently (and successfully) campaigned for a Yes-Yes vote in those heady days, yet within a decade – and within a year of coming to power himself – that part of the will of the Scottish people has been dismissed as “unusable and expensive”; in other words, not worth the hassle.

To retain the power to invoke the Scottish Variable Rate (as it’s formally known), the Scottish Government would have been obliged to make an annual contribution to HMRC, funding that would have escalated as the agency underwent a major IT upgrade in recent years. The SNP saw this as Westminster funding by stealth.

Thus, part of the justification given by John Swinney, Salmond’s predecessor as SNP leader and now his right-hand man as Finance Minister, is that because neither his party nor any of its rivals had any declared intention to vary income tax in Scotland, the responsible move was to block this drain on the Holyrood budget.

Predictably, Swinney didn’t hesitate to turn the argument to his advantage by stating that what Scotland needed was not a costly and limited tax power but full fiscal responsibility, either on the lines recommended by the Calman Commission last year or via his party’s holy grail, independence.

But this presents two ironies: first, introducing either system would induce further costs, either by funding HMRC’s conversion to Calman’s vision or by creating a whole new tax-collecting infrastructure in Edinburgh; second, independence would require the agreement of the Scottish people through a referendum, and the SNP don’t appear to put much stall on half of what they said last time.

More fundamentally, however, there is only so long for which the Scottish Government can go on blaming Westminster for Scotland’s financial ills, especially now they have wilfully and short-sightedly given up the single major lever of fiscal autonomy offered by devolution.

Of course, the grand strategy hiding behind all of this, from the SNP’s point of view, is to deconstruct and thus devalue New Labour’s devolution success story and undermine Calman’s vision for its evolution.

The party has calculated that if it is to have any chance of forcing a referendum after the next election (an election it is widely expected to lose anyway), it will have to water down the starkness of the choice that is put to the Scottish people, and Calman has already muscled his way into that equation.

The real danger for the nationalists is that his appealing “devolution plus” compromise option may pull a core of electors reluctantly flirting with independence back from the brink, shifting the independence horizon even farther out of sight.

Friday, 5 November 2010

Who's Really Saying "Yes We Can, But..."?

On the face of it, Tuesday’s US mid-term election results represented a (not unexpected) mauling for President Obama and the Democratic Party.

The loss of their comfortable majority in the House of Representatives – replaced by a sizeable Republican advantage – coupled with the loss of a handful of Senate seats means that the President’s men on the Hill face a very different couple of years than those they have enjoyed since even before the historic events of November 2008.

Which, given the controversies and frustrations witnessed in Congress already during Obama’s reign, must give cause for concern amongst his supporters that what has proved tricky to achieve so far will become well-nigh impossible.

What is clear is that not everyone who fanned the whirlwind of feverish optimism that blew Obama into the Oval Office was sufficiently aware of just what they were getting themselves into – and how unfeasibly idealistic it all was. True, much of the hype was media-generated, but the man at the centre of it all was not exactly to be found containing the fuss, and his own rhetoric merely inflated the false expectations.

Notice how the headline slogan has belatedly become “Yes we can, but…”.

For instance, the (incomplete) realisation of the President’s vision of universal health insurance, the realities of which plainly were not spelt out during the election campaign, has angered many in Washington and beyond – including Democratic politicians from across the nation, some of whom conspicuously distanced themselves from this and other policies in their battle for re-election this week.

What is particularly galling is that, in forcing through the healthcare legislation, Obama and his Congressional colleagues employed precisely the sort of partisan tribalism, underhand tactics and blatant fulfilment of individuals’ special interests that the President so often railed against in his many stirring orations as a candidate.

The sheer extent to which the healthcare battle has occupied the minds of those in the White House and Congress has resulted in a disappointing lack of progress elsewhere. Issues like immigration, and especially climate change – which Obama so ruthlessly exploited in seeking the vital ‘young vote’ two years ago – appear to have slipped down the priorities list, to say the least.

Beyond America’s borders, political intrusion in decisions about the strategy in Afghanistan jeopardised the confidence of, and ultimately contributed to the loss of, the skilled and respected General McChrystal as commander of the coalition forces there.

Meanwhile, an early speech in Cairo promising a new American attitude to Middle East has now largely been forgotten; the strategy mired in the same old diplomatic deadlocks while Iran’s unashamed uranium enrichment and Israel’s routine suppression of Palestinians’ freedoms continue unabated.

To highlight Obama’s under-achievements in this way is itself to unfairly disregard the successes he has enjoyed, not the least of which is the careful steering of the world’s largest economy through (and out of) a potentially crippling recession. But even here, unemployment is still struggling to recover long after the return to growth, requiring the use of fiscal and monetary stimuli to continue longer than previously anticipated – just this week, concerns were expressed around the world about the knock-on effect of America’s latest cash injection on currency markets and exports.

It’s no wonder, therefore, that (in the President’s own words) the American people are “frustrated”, and it is true that large Congressional majorities in the President’s favour never last, especially in times of hardship. Thus the Republicans’ success was to a large extent inevitable, and came rather in spite of than because of their own campaigning activities and tactics.

The rise of the so-called Tea Party movement has captured the imagination of those, especially on the right but across the political spectrum, who have rapidly become disillusioned with the man who promised them Hope. But in reality the movement threatens the Grand Old Party’s chances of winning back power after a single term.

It is not only common knowledge but common sense that elections are won by conquering the centre ground. But those behind the Tea Party movement seem more interested in maintaining a sort of ideological purity within the Republican Party than in pursuing electoral success.

There were some notable scalps for the movement, such as Rand Paul (who is now seen as the group’s Congressional figurehead), but also defeats for high-profile candidates like Christine O’Donnell. Some House and gubernatorial posts that should have turned Red went Blue because centrist electorates resisted a lurch to the right.

What makes the run-up to 2012 even more fascinating is the question of what those who did win a seat on the Hill do next. Just like any anti-establishment organisation, the Tea Party has been comfortable in its role of shouting from the outside. Now it must speak from within.

With that comes the privilege of influence but also a share of the responsibility for the outcome. Co-operate in failure and the electorate will not discriminate in apportioning blame; obstruct genuine progress and the result could be a whole lot worse; many expect Sarah Palin, dubbed the Tea Party’s spiritual leader, to be a front-runner for the Republican Presidential nomination – selecting her would be a brave choice.

A lot, of course, will also depend on matters outwith the politicians’ immediate control – the country’s economic performance, the activities of rogue states abroad, the success of the healthcare reforms and so on.

But one thing is for sure – winning as they have this week was the easy bit for the G.O.P – it is the Party’s behaviour over the next two years that will largely determine whether Obama is given more time to see his vision through.

He’s not the only one pledging “yes we can, but…”.