On the day that the coalition partners unveiled an expanded form of their policy programme, the final part of my post-election overview focuses on the remaining, domestic issues not addressed in previous posts. These are the ‘bread and butter’ issues – from high-profile areas like health and education to more mundane topics like welfare, and law and order.
And today’s document builds on last week’s policy outlines to provide a comprehensive blueprint for the next five years of domestic government activity.
On schools (now administered by the renamed Department for Education), the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats played out something of a score draw in last week’s talks, with the former’s flagship ‘free schools’ idea enshrined in both versions of the coalition agreement, while the Lib Dems (supported anyway by the Tories) keep their pet policy, pupil premiums.
This last policy, according to both policy documents, will be funded from savings elsewhere – in other words, the schools budget will essentially be ring-fenced. Indeed there are many areas in which spending commitments seem to have grown in number since last week and especially compared to the manifestos – a consequence, perhaps, of two parties both keen to honour commitments made to their respective interest groups.
The ring-fencing of, and guarantee of real-terms increases in, NHS spending is one example of this, but the classic case is with respect to pensioners. The future of work and retirement is an issue that will feature heavily in this blog, and the coalition’s (chiefly the Conservatives’) decision to bring forward the raising and eventual phasing-out of the default retirement age is absolutely the right one in the context of an ageing population.
But it is not good enough and not acceptable to couple this with the Liberal Democrats’ ‘triple guarantee’ to up-rate the basic state pension by the higher of price and wage inflation and by a minimum of 2.5%, at the same time as constraining public-sector salaries – and compounding this by retaining unfettered and unregulated freebies like the winter fuel allowance.
This politically-motivated profligacy contrasts sharply with the many other areas in which the new authority appears keen to demonstrate its impatience with inefficient spending in routine government activity. The most high-profile example is welfare, where rules restricting the rights of jobseekers’ to receive support if they refuse opportunities offered to them are to be tightened, and capability assessments will be made of all Incapacity Benefit claimants.
Tough talking (and action) is also to be expected on tackling crime. What is intriguing about this area is the apparent contradiction between the new government’s repeated pledges to cut bureaucracy, and the proposed improvements in the detail and transparency of crime statistics, with localised figures to be published monthly, and better reporting to be made of hate crimes.
The aim, of course, is to increase police accountability, as well as public involvement in crime-fighting (for example by empowering people to protect themselves, their property and their communities without fear of punishment), as part of the coalition’s “big society” vision.
It’s a vision that has survived the process of forming the coalition, and one which both parties (but, one suspects, the Conservatives more enthusiastically than the Liberal Democrats) hope will define the government’s five-year term. Suffice to say, that remains to be seen – and I feel I’m not the only one who remains to be convinced.
Thursday, 20 May 2010
Wednesday, 19 May 2010
What Price International Unity?
Ask anyone to name an issue on which the Liberal Democrats campaigned for this year’s election with a distinctive policy position and the most common answer may well be political reform, or perhaps immigration (both of which have already been discussed in this blog). Two other contenders, however, would be defence and Europe.
Having never recovered from the nerves that paralysed Tony Blair’s government on the Europe issue, Labour now fall clearly into second place behind the Lib Dems in terms of pro-European UK parties. And although the Eurozone’s recent troubles must surely have spooked a party which ranks a proclaimed economic guru among its leading figures, Nick Clegg and his colleagues declared themselves in favour of British entry into the Euro in the long term.
No doubt some stern words from Conservative coalition negotiators changed all that. The new government’s official position combines “positive participation” in the EU with refusing to join the Euro in the foreseeable future, a determination to fight for British interests in budget negotiations, the protection of British civil liberties in European law, the imposition of a referendum requirement for ratification of any future Treaty that proposed any transfer of power, and a pledge to press for the European Parliament to be based solely in Brussels.
That’s quite a task. But of course, this patriotic rhetoric about Europe is nothing new. What it means in the context of the coalition deal is a victory for the leadership of a Conservative Party for which Europe continues to epitomise divisions between its opposing wings.
For almost two decades, declared Conservative policies on continental relations have represented successive masterpieces of diplomacy. However, their 2010 manifesto delivers the closest thing to a rant about the state of Europe that the party is ever likely to produce.
The Lib Dems, on the other hand, were much more measured in this area, and this seems to be the way in which their contribution has influenced the coalition’s position – the Strasbourg gripe aside, the substantive contents of the policy on Europe are almost entirely Conservative.
The other major international issue on which the Lib Dems were roundly shouted down in negotiations was defence. Of course, all three parties said all the right things on Afghanistan in the lead-up to the election and this is simply not an area for inter-party disunity.
The future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent is quite a different matter, however. The Liberal Democrats – with some justification, in my view – went out on a limb to argue for the substantial scaling down of the deterrent as part of broader moves towards non-proliferation. They were vociferously opposed on this front by both Tories and Labour – rare unity indeed.
It seems Trident is one of those great untouchable issues on which no-one dare diverge from a policy of maintaining the status quo. But the idea of Britain boasting a fleet of submarines specifically designed to respond, for the sake of mankind, to the threat of an intercontinental nuclear strike is surely something that should have been left behind in the Cold War days of the 20th century. That replacing it would cost £100bn surely closes the case.
True, Britain’s withdrawal from the international nuclear-weapons ‘scene’ should be both phased and co-ordinated with international developments, with a less comprehensive and much less expensive equivalent being used as a stepping stone to bide some time. I personally don’t have a lot of faith in current non-proliferation efforts – one cannot exactly expect the likes of Iran to drop everything at once – but that is no reason to give up on the ambition.
As it is, the Lib Dems’ determination to see a radical rethink of defence policy has been watered down to an agreement that the renewal of Trident should go ahead subject to scrutiny of its value for money and the freedom to make the case (presumably in vain) for alternatives. Yet the Conservatives have also pledged to “play a strong role” in NPT discussions and press for continued progress on multilateral disarmament.
Another crisis of credibility amid more Eastern accusations of hypocrisy, surely beckons.
Having never recovered from the nerves that paralysed Tony Blair’s government on the Europe issue, Labour now fall clearly into second place behind the Lib Dems in terms of pro-European UK parties. And although the Eurozone’s recent troubles must surely have spooked a party which ranks a proclaimed economic guru among its leading figures, Nick Clegg and his colleagues declared themselves in favour of British entry into the Euro in the long term.
No doubt some stern words from Conservative coalition negotiators changed all that. The new government’s official position combines “positive participation” in the EU with refusing to join the Euro in the foreseeable future, a determination to fight for British interests in budget negotiations, the protection of British civil liberties in European law, the imposition of a referendum requirement for ratification of any future Treaty that proposed any transfer of power, and a pledge to press for the European Parliament to be based solely in Brussels.
That’s quite a task. But of course, this patriotic rhetoric about Europe is nothing new. What it means in the context of the coalition deal is a victory for the leadership of a Conservative Party for which Europe continues to epitomise divisions between its opposing wings.
For almost two decades, declared Conservative policies on continental relations have represented successive masterpieces of diplomacy. However, their 2010 manifesto delivers the closest thing to a rant about the state of Europe that the party is ever likely to produce.
The Lib Dems, on the other hand, were much more measured in this area, and this seems to be the way in which their contribution has influenced the coalition’s position – the Strasbourg gripe aside, the substantive contents of the policy on Europe are almost entirely Conservative.
The other major international issue on which the Lib Dems were roundly shouted down in negotiations was defence. Of course, all three parties said all the right things on Afghanistan in the lead-up to the election and this is simply not an area for inter-party disunity.
The future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent is quite a different matter, however. The Liberal Democrats – with some justification, in my view – went out on a limb to argue for the substantial scaling down of the deterrent as part of broader moves towards non-proliferation. They were vociferously opposed on this front by both Tories and Labour – rare unity indeed.
It seems Trident is one of those great untouchable issues on which no-one dare diverge from a policy of maintaining the status quo. But the idea of Britain boasting a fleet of submarines specifically designed to respond, for the sake of mankind, to the threat of an intercontinental nuclear strike is surely something that should have been left behind in the Cold War days of the 20th century. That replacing it would cost £100bn surely closes the case.
True, Britain’s withdrawal from the international nuclear-weapons ‘scene’ should be both phased and co-ordinated with international developments, with a less comprehensive and much less expensive equivalent being used as a stepping stone to bide some time. I personally don’t have a lot of faith in current non-proliferation efforts – one cannot exactly expect the likes of Iran to drop everything at once – but that is no reason to give up on the ambition.
As it is, the Lib Dems’ determination to see a radical rethink of defence policy has been watered down to an agreement that the renewal of Trident should go ahead subject to scrutiny of its value for money and the freedom to make the case (presumably in vain) for alternatives. Yet the Conservatives have also pledged to “play a strong role” in NPT discussions and press for continued progress on multilateral disarmament.
Another crisis of credibility amid more Eastern accusations of hypocrisy, surely beckons.
Immigration the Conservative Way
Having been one of the most consistent headaches for the Labour government throughout its reign, the contentious issue of immigration became a major flashpoint during the election campaign, both between the parties and amongst the public at large.
This is somewhat surprising in the light of the government’s recent moves to fill the gaping hole that Britain’s borders once represented - the success of Labour’s ‘Australian-style’ points system was evident in the cross-party consensus to retain it, however the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives advocated widely contrasting supplementary measures.
So one can imagine that the same impassioned arguments were had between the likes of William Hague and Simon Hughes during the coalition agreements as had been played out between David Cameron and Nick Clegg in the leaders’ debates. In the end, the Conservatives won a convincing and highly significant victory.
Earned citizenship – in other words, an amnesty – for illegal immigrants, a policy that Nick Clegg fought hard to stand by throughout the campaign but which proved his undoing in the later debates, was ditched. The policy of regionalised visas for economic migrants, to ensure that these new workers were channelled only to those areas that needed them and could accommodate them, was also excluded from the coalition agreement.
On the other hand, the Conservative-proposed cap on non-EU immigration whose practical operation Nick Clegg found so hard to comprehend, forms the solitary paragraph in last week’s coalition agreement document, with a provision to jointly consider the mechanism for implementation.
The Lib Dems did extract an agreement to end the detention of children in immigration centres, but it is hard to imagine that this met with much opposition from Tory negotiators, especially in the context of the victories they scored elsewhere on the immigration battlefield.
Finally, the coalition partners had long since agreed that plans for ID cards and biometric passports, together with the National Identity Database, were an unnecessary use of public money and these have been scrapped, while on related civil liberties issues, the children’s Contact Point database will also be ditched, and there will be safeguards on both the use of CCTV cameras and the storage of innocent people’s DNA; all of these policies were entirely consensual.
Overall, despite the likelihood of some limited Lib Dem input, UK immigration policy in the next five years will virtually resemble that of a majority Conservative government.
This is somewhat surprising in the light of the government’s recent moves to fill the gaping hole that Britain’s borders once represented - the success of Labour’s ‘Australian-style’ points system was evident in the cross-party consensus to retain it, however the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives advocated widely contrasting supplementary measures.
So one can imagine that the same impassioned arguments were had between the likes of William Hague and Simon Hughes during the coalition agreements as had been played out between David Cameron and Nick Clegg in the leaders’ debates. In the end, the Conservatives won a convincing and highly significant victory.
Earned citizenship – in other words, an amnesty – for illegal immigrants, a policy that Nick Clegg fought hard to stand by throughout the campaign but which proved his undoing in the later debates, was ditched. The policy of regionalised visas for economic migrants, to ensure that these new workers were channelled only to those areas that needed them and could accommodate them, was also excluded from the coalition agreement.
On the other hand, the Conservative-proposed cap on non-EU immigration whose practical operation Nick Clegg found so hard to comprehend, forms the solitary paragraph in last week’s coalition agreement document, with a provision to jointly consider the mechanism for implementation.
The Lib Dems did extract an agreement to end the detention of children in immigration centres, but it is hard to imagine that this met with much opposition from Tory negotiators, especially in the context of the victories they scored elsewhere on the immigration battlefield.
Finally, the coalition partners had long since agreed that plans for ID cards and biometric passports, together with the National Identity Database, were an unnecessary use of public money and these have been scrapped, while on related civil liberties issues, the children’s Contact Point database will also be ditched, and there will be safeguards on both the use of CCTV cameras and the storage of innocent people’s DNA; all of these policies were entirely consensual.
Overall, despite the likelihood of some limited Lib Dem input, UK immigration policy in the next five years will virtually resemble that of a majority Conservative government.
Tuesday, 18 May 2010
Political Reform - For Better And Worse
In the aftermath of the expenses saga that sparked so much debate about the political system and its faults, it is perhaps reassuring that political reform accounts for around one whole page – more than any other single issue. It is also another area where both sides of the coalition are having to tread very carefully in order to satisfy both their supporters and their wider critics.
One constitutional change that has already sparked a row is the decision to introduce fixed-term parliaments lasting five years, in place of the old system in which the prime minister decided when to call an election. Advocates say it increases stability and certainty about the future; opponents say it is anti-democratic – a fix designed to ‘lock in’ the new government.
Some critics even argue that the change increases the power of the executive, the growth of which under Labour was so heavily criticised by both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. I reject this argument. Just as coalition governments are the norm in other western democracies, so is a fixed term for which those governments are elected to govern.
After all, what greater power can the executive possibly hold than to call the shots on when they and their opponents are subjected to the most fundamental democratic scrutiny?
Besides, remember the controversy regarding Tony Blair’s declaration of his intention to serve a full third term before stepping down, only to be driven out of office after two years and replaced by an unelected prime minister? That situation almost certainly would not have arisen under fixed-term parliaments.
By contrast, the decision to increase to 55% the proportion of MPs who must oppose the government in a vote of confidence is suspicious. The difference is potentially significant – under the current 50% rule, the Conservatives would need the support of most Lib Dem ministers to survive a confidence vote; with 55% (358 votes) required, the Tories’ 307 votes alone would be enough, with room to spare.
Stability, yes, but at what cost to accountability?
Elsewhere, the agreement on holding a referendum on the Alternative Vote (AV) system is well-documented, and – for all the proclaimed opposition to it among Conservative ranks – it does not exactly represent a transformation; MPs would still be elected on a constituency basis, albeit requiring 50% support (through second and third preferences) to be elected.
It may be a first step, but it would need a much greater climb-down yet for the establishment to accept moves towards an actually proportional voting system. Nevertheless, voting reform has long been a defining policy for the Lib Dems, its inclusion in the coalition agreement is justifiably celebrated, and they probably stand to gain more than their rivals from AV.
Other, welcome moves on issues such as Lords reform and the power of recall of MPs did not cause particular controversy between the parties, although the latter will work in practice will be interesting, as any MP could become a subject of a petition by rather more than 10% of their electorate merely through the collusion of all those who voted against them at the polls.
Another issue on which both sides were previously agreed – and to which this blog will often return in the future – is the future of devolution. The parties have backed the implementation of the Calman Commission’s proposals for Scotland, and the offer of a referendum on greater powers for the Welsh Assembly. Attempts will also be made to answer the West Lothian Question…
One constitutional change that has already sparked a row is the decision to introduce fixed-term parliaments lasting five years, in place of the old system in which the prime minister decided when to call an election. Advocates say it increases stability and certainty about the future; opponents say it is anti-democratic – a fix designed to ‘lock in’ the new government.
Some critics even argue that the change increases the power of the executive, the growth of which under Labour was so heavily criticised by both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. I reject this argument. Just as coalition governments are the norm in other western democracies, so is a fixed term for which those governments are elected to govern.
After all, what greater power can the executive possibly hold than to call the shots on when they and their opponents are subjected to the most fundamental democratic scrutiny?
Besides, remember the controversy regarding Tony Blair’s declaration of his intention to serve a full third term before stepping down, only to be driven out of office after two years and replaced by an unelected prime minister? That situation almost certainly would not have arisen under fixed-term parliaments.
By contrast, the decision to increase to 55% the proportion of MPs who must oppose the government in a vote of confidence is suspicious. The difference is potentially significant – under the current 50% rule, the Conservatives would need the support of most Lib Dem ministers to survive a confidence vote; with 55% (358 votes) required, the Tories’ 307 votes alone would be enough, with room to spare.
Stability, yes, but at what cost to accountability?
Elsewhere, the agreement on holding a referendum on the Alternative Vote (AV) system is well-documented, and – for all the proclaimed opposition to it among Conservative ranks – it does not exactly represent a transformation; MPs would still be elected on a constituency basis, albeit requiring 50% support (through second and third preferences) to be elected.
It may be a first step, but it would need a much greater climb-down yet for the establishment to accept moves towards an actually proportional voting system. Nevertheless, voting reform has long been a defining policy for the Lib Dems, its inclusion in the coalition agreement is justifiably celebrated, and they probably stand to gain more than their rivals from AV.
Other, welcome moves on issues such as Lords reform and the power of recall of MPs did not cause particular controversy between the parties, although the latter will work in practice will be interesting, as any MP could become a subject of a petition by rather more than 10% of their electorate merely through the collusion of all those who voted against them at the polls.
Another issue on which both sides were previously agreed – and to which this blog will often return in the future – is the future of devolution. The parties have backed the implementation of the Calman Commission’s proposals for Scotland, and the offer of a referendum on greater powers for the Welsh Assembly. Attempts will also be made to answer the West Lothian Question…
Monday, 17 May 2010
A Fair Deal on the Economy
Not surprisingly, the issue of the economy dominated the election campaign and would no doubt have been the first topic of discussion between Conservative and Liberal Democrat negotiators as they endeavoured to reach an agreement on the key issues that would enable a coalition government to be formed.
In the hours and days following the publication of the agreement document, many observers have concluded that the Conservatives won virtually a full house of manifesto pledges, but this is not necessarily the case.
Their biggest victory was on spending cuts, with the Lib Dems – who remained largely silent amid the Labour-Conservative arguments over the timing of cuts – agreeing to Tory plans to make £6bn efficiency savings this year, on top of planned savings previously announced by the Labour Government.
The Conservatives also placed themselves in an extremely strong position, politically and strategically. Not only did George Osborne retain his inheritance of the top job of Chancellor (with Lib Dem rival Vince Cable taking the reasonably high-profile Business brief previously held by Lord Mandelson), Lib Dem negotiator David Laws was handed the poisoned chalice of Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
Until now a post mainly familiar only to political and economic buffs, it is Mr Laws who has direct responsibility for designing the solutions to the country’s cavernous deficit – in tabloid terms, he is the man who will wield the axe. Far from being able to play hostage to the Tories’ agenda, the Lib Dems, too, risk facing the wrath of the electorate in 2015.
We will get our first glimpse of the interplay between Mr Osborne and Mr Laws when details are released next week of the promised £6bn efficiency savings, and again when the Budget is delivered in June, followed by the long-awaited departmental spending review in the autumn.
However, the agreement contains not-insignificant victories for the Lib Dems too. One of these is the inclusion in the coalition agreement of their plan to raise the income tax allowance to £10,000 for all but the highest earners, lifting thousands of low-paid workers out of income tax altogether and reducing the burden for all basic-rate taxpayers. However, this will only be phased in, starting in April next year. In return – crucially – the Conservatives were forced to water down their flagship reversal of the planned rise in National Insurance.
The details of this seem to have escaped widespread public attention, but my understanding of the agreement is that although employer contribution thresholds will be raised as planned to counter what the Tories call a ‘jobs tax’, equivalent adjustments to employee thresholds have been sacrificed in favour of the Lib Dems’ income tax reforms.
Together with the decision to kick the Conservatives’ inheritance tax cut into the proverbial long grass and the right to abstain on tax allowances for married couples, it seems the Lib Dems gained more ground on economic issues – particularly in the field of taxation – than many have assumed. Other notable Tory-advocated tax measures, such as reductions in child trust funds and child tax credits, were not areas of great controversy between the two parties.
As I will outline in succeeding posts, there are a number of issues on which the Conservatives can claim substantial victories in the coalition agreement, but the economy is not one of them.
In the hours and days following the publication of the agreement document, many observers have concluded that the Conservatives won virtually a full house of manifesto pledges, but this is not necessarily the case.
Their biggest victory was on spending cuts, with the Lib Dems – who remained largely silent amid the Labour-Conservative arguments over the timing of cuts – agreeing to Tory plans to make £6bn efficiency savings this year, on top of planned savings previously announced by the Labour Government.
The Conservatives also placed themselves in an extremely strong position, politically and strategically. Not only did George Osborne retain his inheritance of the top job of Chancellor (with Lib Dem rival Vince Cable taking the reasonably high-profile Business brief previously held by Lord Mandelson), Lib Dem negotiator David Laws was handed the poisoned chalice of Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
Until now a post mainly familiar only to political and economic buffs, it is Mr Laws who has direct responsibility for designing the solutions to the country’s cavernous deficit – in tabloid terms, he is the man who will wield the axe. Far from being able to play hostage to the Tories’ agenda, the Lib Dems, too, risk facing the wrath of the electorate in 2015.
We will get our first glimpse of the interplay between Mr Osborne and Mr Laws when details are released next week of the promised £6bn efficiency savings, and again when the Budget is delivered in June, followed by the long-awaited departmental spending review in the autumn.
However, the agreement contains not-insignificant victories for the Lib Dems too. One of these is the inclusion in the coalition agreement of their plan to raise the income tax allowance to £10,000 for all but the highest earners, lifting thousands of low-paid workers out of income tax altogether and reducing the burden for all basic-rate taxpayers. However, this will only be phased in, starting in April next year. In return – crucially – the Conservatives were forced to water down their flagship reversal of the planned rise in National Insurance.
The details of this seem to have escaped widespread public attention, but my understanding of the agreement is that although employer contribution thresholds will be raised as planned to counter what the Tories call a ‘jobs tax’, equivalent adjustments to employee thresholds have been sacrificed in favour of the Lib Dems’ income tax reforms.
Together with the decision to kick the Conservatives’ inheritance tax cut into the proverbial long grass and the right to abstain on tax allowances for married couples, it seems the Lib Dems gained more ground on economic issues – particularly in the field of taxation – than many have assumed. Other notable Tory-advocated tax measures, such as reductions in child trust funds and child tax credits, were not areas of great controversy between the two parties.
As I will outline in succeeding posts, there are a number of issues on which the Conservatives can claim substantial victories in the coalition agreement, but the economy is not one of them.
Not So Different After All?
There has been much discussion about the coalition agreement that formed the basis of the new government. The document was published last week amid accusations from supporters of both sides that their respective dealmakers had ‘sold out’ or even betrayed their electorate. This conclusion was odd, given the number of Conservative policies left intact in the deal, and the relative ‘fair cop’ won by a shrunken third party.
In particular, many observers were angered by the Lib Dem leadership’s abandonment of the possibility of a progressive alliance, instead (allegedly) opting to switch ideological sides. On the contrary, I would argue that this political blueprint in fact highlights the many similarities between David Cameron’s much-vaunted “modern” party, and the traditional occupiers of the centre ground.
In the following series of short posts, I will assess the gains and losses made by each party in each of a number of key policy areas, starting with the economy, and conclude on the overall shades of blue and orange colouring the coalition’s policy platform. My hypothesis is that the Conservatives were clear winners in a majority of policy areas – but that this is both fair and inevitable given their 13-point vote-share and 250-seat advantage over their coalition partners.
Indeed, the Liberal Democrats’ haul of 5 Cabinet posts and 20 ministerial positions for just 57 Commons seats surely represents a victory in itself. Although the Conservatives have taken most if not all of the ‘key’ positions – Chancellor, Home and Foreign Affairs, Education and Health, and so on – it seems Nick Clegg’s position as Cameron’s Deputy and right-hand man, and leader on political reform, is more substantial than was first thought; meanwhile, the Prime Minister made a point of visiting the Department for Business first on his tour of Whitehall last week, endorsing the important role to be played by Vince Cable.
In particular, many observers were angered by the Lib Dem leadership’s abandonment of the possibility of a progressive alliance, instead (allegedly) opting to switch ideological sides. On the contrary, I would argue that this political blueprint in fact highlights the many similarities between David Cameron’s much-vaunted “modern” party, and the traditional occupiers of the centre ground.
In the following series of short posts, I will assess the gains and losses made by each party in each of a number of key policy areas, starting with the economy, and conclude on the overall shades of blue and orange colouring the coalition’s policy platform. My hypothesis is that the Conservatives were clear winners in a majority of policy areas – but that this is both fair and inevitable given their 13-point vote-share and 250-seat advantage over their coalition partners.
Indeed, the Liberal Democrats’ haul of 5 Cabinet posts and 20 ministerial positions for just 57 Commons seats surely represents a victory in itself. Although the Conservatives have taken most if not all of the ‘key’ positions – Chancellor, Home and Foreign Affairs, Education and Health, and so on – it seems Nick Clegg’s position as Cameron’s Deputy and right-hand man, and leader on political reform, is more substantial than was first thought; meanwhile, the Prime Minister made a point of visiting the Department for Business first on his tour of Whitehall last week, endorsing the important role to be played by Vince Cable.
Saturday, 15 May 2010
The Spectre of a Disunited Kingdom
Yesterday I observed that the outcome of this year’s election, despite representing a similar reversal in the political fortunes of the two main parties to that enjoyed by New Labour in 1997, has failed to stir anything approaching the sense of excitement and optimism that greeted that historic result. I also described British party politics in 2010 as being tribal, given the regional variations that are clearly in evidence within this year’s results. Today I want to expand on these two themes, find reasons for them and explore their potential implications.
The most obvious explanation for the first observation is that, although both elections – 1997 and 2010 – took place with the economy emerging out of recession, this year differs from thirteen years ago, in that the recovery is much younger and more fragile, and the medium-term future is much more uncertain. Consequently, the pessimistic air that can be felt across the country could hardly be more different to the wave of optimism that swept the nation the last time a long-serving governing party was ousted from power.
But as my second observation suggests, there is something else holding the country back from embracing this latest incarnation of ‘new politics’ as enthusiastically as its exponents would like – it is the increasingly regionalised nature of party political support, with Labour in particular staying strong in its historic heartlands.
Nowhere is this more true than in my home area, the North East of England, where there was, to all intents and purposes, no ideological shift away from Labour – the two defeats they did suffer – in Stockton South and in Redcar (which saw a swing of 22%, the largest of any English seat) – were delivered by an electorate still frustrated by the government’s failure to halt the mothballing of the nearby steelworks with the loss of 1600 jobs; four other nearby seats all saw swings in excess of 6% away from the entrenched Labour incumbents.
Elsewhere in the area, though, no seats were even realistically targeted by the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats – with the exception of the City of Durham, where after much speculation, support for the sitting Labour MP hardly moved. No wonder the region was billed as the ‘most boring’ at the beginning of the campaign.
It’s a similar story in urban areas across the North and the Midlands, with only a couple of seats in each of the North West, West Yorkshire, the East Midlands, and East Anglia bucking a trend of Labour resistance; only in the West Midlands did Labour lose its grip on some urban areas, and even here, a number of Birmingham constituencies saw pro-Labour swings.
The consequence of these results is that across the North East and elsewhere, thousands of people – a majority of people – are left wondering why it is that they will be governed by a combination of the two parties they so emphatically rejected. Given the impending cuts in government spending, it is no surprise that anger and anxiety is particularly keenly felt in a region with one of the highest levels of public-sector employment in the country.
However, the sense of discord between electorate and government is surely greatest in Scotland, where not a single seat changed hands last week, and where Labour’s share of the vote actually increased by 2.5 points to 42%, with the party crossing the 1 million mark in terms of votes won. In the central belt, only two seats are held by any other party (the Lib Dems hold both), and one of these – Edinburgh West – saw an 11.4% swing from Lib to Lab.
As for the Conservatives, hopes of adding to their solitary seat in Dumfriesshire were dashed, with target seats like Dumfries and Angus returning swings against them. It’s a far cry from the last change of government, when the incumbent Tories were kicked out of Scotland altogether – a humiliation from which the Scottish wing of the party has yet to recover.
All of which raises some intriguing questions about the role of Scotland and the Union, and – despite their failure to make any in-roads towards their embarrassingly optimistic target of 20 seats – surely strategically empowers the SNP administration in Edinburgh. Elections for the Holyrood Parliament are just 12 months away and it is the Scottish Government’s intention to hold a landmark referendum on its flagship policy of independence before then.
Alex Salmond’s tedious railing against his party’s (wholly justified) exclusion from the leaders’ debates may have got him nowhere, and his apparent belief that Scotland should somehow be immune from the tax rises and/or spending cuts to come may be naïve in the extreme, but he did at least succeed in keeping his face, and with it his party, in the media spotlight ahead of an election that he did not contest – and his arguments may curry favour with the many Scots who remain either undecided or unconvinced about his ultimate goal.
David Cameron may be making all the right moves on ‘the Scotland question’, making a priority of visiting St Andrew’s House to have what appear to be amicable and constructive talks with Alex Salmond and his Finance Secretary John Swinney yesterday, but the tough decisions and the difficult truths remain. The critical issue of the size of the Scottish pot now pits the Treasury in between an increasingly confident Scottish public that overwhelmingly rejected the Conservative Party, and a restless English electorate that is responsible for 340 of the coalition government’s 363 seats.
The politics of Scotland and its future role in the Union have been the subject of surprisingly little debate in recent days and weeks, and it’s an issue that I will return to many times over the course of the critical twelve months that lie ahead.
The most obvious explanation for the first observation is that, although both elections – 1997 and 2010 – took place with the economy emerging out of recession, this year differs from thirteen years ago, in that the recovery is much younger and more fragile, and the medium-term future is much more uncertain. Consequently, the pessimistic air that can be felt across the country could hardly be more different to the wave of optimism that swept the nation the last time a long-serving governing party was ousted from power.
But as my second observation suggests, there is something else holding the country back from embracing this latest incarnation of ‘new politics’ as enthusiastically as its exponents would like – it is the increasingly regionalised nature of party political support, with Labour in particular staying strong in its historic heartlands.
Nowhere is this more true than in my home area, the North East of England, where there was, to all intents and purposes, no ideological shift away from Labour – the two defeats they did suffer – in Stockton South and in Redcar (which saw a swing of 22%, the largest of any English seat) – were delivered by an electorate still frustrated by the government’s failure to halt the mothballing of the nearby steelworks with the loss of 1600 jobs; four other nearby seats all saw swings in excess of 6% away from the entrenched Labour incumbents.
Elsewhere in the area, though, no seats were even realistically targeted by the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats – with the exception of the City of Durham, where after much speculation, support for the sitting Labour MP hardly moved. No wonder the region was billed as the ‘most boring’ at the beginning of the campaign.
It’s a similar story in urban areas across the North and the Midlands, with only a couple of seats in each of the North West, West Yorkshire, the East Midlands, and East Anglia bucking a trend of Labour resistance; only in the West Midlands did Labour lose its grip on some urban areas, and even here, a number of Birmingham constituencies saw pro-Labour swings.
The consequence of these results is that across the North East and elsewhere, thousands of people – a majority of people – are left wondering why it is that they will be governed by a combination of the two parties they so emphatically rejected. Given the impending cuts in government spending, it is no surprise that anger and anxiety is particularly keenly felt in a region with one of the highest levels of public-sector employment in the country.
However, the sense of discord between electorate and government is surely greatest in Scotland, where not a single seat changed hands last week, and where Labour’s share of the vote actually increased by 2.5 points to 42%, with the party crossing the 1 million mark in terms of votes won. In the central belt, only two seats are held by any other party (the Lib Dems hold both), and one of these – Edinburgh West – saw an 11.4% swing from Lib to Lab.
As for the Conservatives, hopes of adding to their solitary seat in Dumfriesshire were dashed, with target seats like Dumfries and Angus returning swings against them. It’s a far cry from the last change of government, when the incumbent Tories were kicked out of Scotland altogether – a humiliation from which the Scottish wing of the party has yet to recover.
All of which raises some intriguing questions about the role of Scotland and the Union, and – despite their failure to make any in-roads towards their embarrassingly optimistic target of 20 seats – surely strategically empowers the SNP administration in Edinburgh. Elections for the Holyrood Parliament are just 12 months away and it is the Scottish Government’s intention to hold a landmark referendum on its flagship policy of independence before then.
Alex Salmond’s tedious railing against his party’s (wholly justified) exclusion from the leaders’ debates may have got him nowhere, and his apparent belief that Scotland should somehow be immune from the tax rises and/or spending cuts to come may be naïve in the extreme, but he did at least succeed in keeping his face, and with it his party, in the media spotlight ahead of an election that he did not contest – and his arguments may curry favour with the many Scots who remain either undecided or unconvinced about his ultimate goal.
David Cameron may be making all the right moves on ‘the Scotland question’, making a priority of visiting St Andrew’s House to have what appear to be amicable and constructive talks with Alex Salmond and his Finance Secretary John Swinney yesterday, but the tough decisions and the difficult truths remain. The critical issue of the size of the Scottish pot now pits the Treasury in between an increasingly confident Scottish public that overwhelmingly rejected the Conservative Party, and a restless English electorate that is responsible for 340 of the coalition government’s 363 seats.
The politics of Scotland and its future role in the Union have been the subject of surprisingly little debate in recent days and weeks, and it’s an issue that I will return to many times over the course of the critical twelve months that lie ahead.
Friday, 14 May 2010
Did You Vote For This?
Last week, almost thirty million people participated in the UK general election, casting ballots for representatives of twenty parties as well as a host of independents. Yet less than a week later, a government was formed for which not a single person voted; a government whose outline policies are set out in a document that is not subject to any electoral scrutiny.
It’s a striking and sobering interpretation of the events of recent days, and one that is, for many, both persuasive and difficult to swallow. But it’s also the inescapable reality of coalition governments, of which we will see many more in future if those crying out for ‘fair votes’ get their wish by seeing proportional representation adopted at Westminster elections. In some cases it seems that it is the very same sort of people who would like to see such a change, who have been railing against the “undemocratic” outcome of last week’s vote.
In terms of the nature of the coalition, I will assess the two parties’ gains and concessions at the weekend, but suffice it to ask how one could expect anything other than a predominantly Conservative cabinet and a Conservative-dominated policy agenda from a coalition consisting of more than five times as many Tory MPs as Lib Dems? Indeed, looking from a different perspective, one might say the Liberals have done well to have five seats at the table, and around 20 ministers in all, from an electoral yield of only 57 seats – five fewer than before.
Nevertheless, the truth is that, from the point of view of democracy (whichever party allegiance one possesses), the coalition that emerged was the best – or perhaps ‘least bad’ – option. With a ‘grand coalition’ between the two largest parties clearly inconceivable, the only remaining two-party coalition that could command an overall majority was one between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. It may be that no-one voted for this outcome, but the mandate for any other resolution was even weaker.
It seems certain that this ‘parliamentary arithmetic’ was a significant factor in determining the outcome of the dual negotiations earlier this week. After all, Nick Clegg had declared in advance of polling day the obvious truth that – irrespective of constitutional protocol – a party that gains the most votes and the most seats in an election that results in a hung parliament, nevertheless has the moral right to take the lead in seeking to form a government.
So it was no surprise that he turned his head first towards the Tories, whilst pragmatically keeping open the option of a more overtly progressive alliance with Labour. But the latter option would either have required settling for a minority administration hoping to gain a handful of extra votes for each individual bill – on an assumption of there being no backbench revolts – or (even more implausibly) attempting to cobble together a ‘rainbow’ alliance with fringe parties, possibly the DUP, or both nationalist parties, or some other dubious patchwork.
Regardless of the political headache that such eventualities would have caused, with a stalemate culminating in a second election surely inevitable as the country took leave of any meaningful form of leadership, a government arrangement that went out of its way to exclude the most popular party simply would have been appallingly undemocratic. The Tories may not have ‘won’ the election but the Labour Party most certainly lost it, and it was a relief when the cool-headed arguments made by some ex-ministers to this effect, finally prevailed.
But was there something other than simple parliamentary and democratic logic obstructing the Liberal Democrats’ path towards what would have been a coalition of the defeated? At least one member of the Lib Dem negotiating team has said publicly that their Labour counterparts were obstructive in the process of finding a compromise deal, not least because they refused to come to terms with the implications of their electoral reversal, and instead insisted on trying to impose their full policy programme on any agreement.
The harsh reality, of course, is that Labour lost the argument on the major issues – perhaps on the timing of government spending cuts, or on the rise in employers’ and employees’ National Insurance contributions; possibly on their refusal to support any of the bold anti-immigration measures advocated by their opponents, or their resistance to wholesale reform of public services like education. Maybe the public no longer trusted Labour on the economy, or political reform, or defence. Maybe, after 13 years, it was simply time for a change.
However, none of these explanations would explain the lack of an overall majority for the main opposition party, or the absence of the sense of political renewal (if not economic renewal, given the current circumstances) that both precipitated and greeted Tony Blair’s rise to power, after eighteen years of Conservative rule, in 1997. Nationally, the frustrated minority seems more united and more vocal, while support for the defeated party remains undiminished – even reinforced – in many areas of the country.
In fact, despite the three-sided result of this and other recent elections, party politics in the UK seems to have become more tribal over the course of the last Parliament – culminating in some of the patterns of the 2010 results. For example, 297 of the Conservatives’ 306 seats are in England – notwithstanding stubborn Labour strongholds like the North East – and although the Tories more than doubled their tally in Wales, they still account for only one fifth of the seats there; in Northern Ireland, their alliance with the Ulster Unionists backfired, while in Scotland – the starkest of all regional results – they made no gains at all.
No wonder, then, that many voters are wondering how, if at all, their vote contributed to the formation of the government that now looks set to run the rule over the United Kingdom for the next five years.
It’s a striking and sobering interpretation of the events of recent days, and one that is, for many, both persuasive and difficult to swallow. But it’s also the inescapable reality of coalition governments, of which we will see many more in future if those crying out for ‘fair votes’ get their wish by seeing proportional representation adopted at Westminster elections. In some cases it seems that it is the very same sort of people who would like to see such a change, who have been railing against the “undemocratic” outcome of last week’s vote.
In terms of the nature of the coalition, I will assess the two parties’ gains and concessions at the weekend, but suffice it to ask how one could expect anything other than a predominantly Conservative cabinet and a Conservative-dominated policy agenda from a coalition consisting of more than five times as many Tory MPs as Lib Dems? Indeed, looking from a different perspective, one might say the Liberals have done well to have five seats at the table, and around 20 ministers in all, from an electoral yield of only 57 seats – five fewer than before.
Nevertheless, the truth is that, from the point of view of democracy (whichever party allegiance one possesses), the coalition that emerged was the best – or perhaps ‘least bad’ – option. With a ‘grand coalition’ between the two largest parties clearly inconceivable, the only remaining two-party coalition that could command an overall majority was one between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. It may be that no-one voted for this outcome, but the mandate for any other resolution was even weaker.
It seems certain that this ‘parliamentary arithmetic’ was a significant factor in determining the outcome of the dual negotiations earlier this week. After all, Nick Clegg had declared in advance of polling day the obvious truth that – irrespective of constitutional protocol – a party that gains the most votes and the most seats in an election that results in a hung parliament, nevertheless has the moral right to take the lead in seeking to form a government.
So it was no surprise that he turned his head first towards the Tories, whilst pragmatically keeping open the option of a more overtly progressive alliance with Labour. But the latter option would either have required settling for a minority administration hoping to gain a handful of extra votes for each individual bill – on an assumption of there being no backbench revolts – or (even more implausibly) attempting to cobble together a ‘rainbow’ alliance with fringe parties, possibly the DUP, or both nationalist parties, or some other dubious patchwork.
Regardless of the political headache that such eventualities would have caused, with a stalemate culminating in a second election surely inevitable as the country took leave of any meaningful form of leadership, a government arrangement that went out of its way to exclude the most popular party simply would have been appallingly undemocratic. The Tories may not have ‘won’ the election but the Labour Party most certainly lost it, and it was a relief when the cool-headed arguments made by some ex-ministers to this effect, finally prevailed.
But was there something other than simple parliamentary and democratic logic obstructing the Liberal Democrats’ path towards what would have been a coalition of the defeated? At least one member of the Lib Dem negotiating team has said publicly that their Labour counterparts were obstructive in the process of finding a compromise deal, not least because they refused to come to terms with the implications of their electoral reversal, and instead insisted on trying to impose their full policy programme on any agreement.
The harsh reality, of course, is that Labour lost the argument on the major issues – perhaps on the timing of government spending cuts, or on the rise in employers’ and employees’ National Insurance contributions; possibly on their refusal to support any of the bold anti-immigration measures advocated by their opponents, or their resistance to wholesale reform of public services like education. Maybe the public no longer trusted Labour on the economy, or political reform, or defence. Maybe, after 13 years, it was simply time for a change.
However, none of these explanations would explain the lack of an overall majority for the main opposition party, or the absence of the sense of political renewal (if not economic renewal, given the current circumstances) that both precipitated and greeted Tony Blair’s rise to power, after eighteen years of Conservative rule, in 1997. Nationally, the frustrated minority seems more united and more vocal, while support for the defeated party remains undiminished – even reinforced – in many areas of the country.
In fact, despite the three-sided result of this and other recent elections, party politics in the UK seems to have become more tribal over the course of the last Parliament – culminating in some of the patterns of the 2010 results. For example, 297 of the Conservatives’ 306 seats are in England – notwithstanding stubborn Labour strongholds like the North East – and although the Tories more than doubled their tally in Wales, they still account for only one fifth of the seats there; in Northern Ireland, their alliance with the Ulster Unionists backfired, while in Scotland – the starkest of all regional results – they made no gains at all.
No wonder, then, that many voters are wondering how, if at all, their vote contributed to the formation of the government that now looks set to run the rule over the United Kingdom for the next five years.
Thursday, 13 May 2010
An Election Like No Other
It's exactly a week since voters went to the polls in one of the most exciting UK elections for a generation, and provided the spark for a week of events that few in British politics will ever forget. And even as the coalition Cabinet gathered for its first meeting this morning, those looking on could still be forgiven for doing a double-take.
It's a fundamental truth of coalition governments, one that many Western democracies have long since come to terms with, that politicians can spend weeks enthusiastically tearing into their rivals' policies and personalities, only to find themselves sharing power with those same foes within days. But in this country, whose politics is defined by, and renowned for, its adversarial nature, such a pattern of events seems truly remarkable.
Above all it's the timing of this outcome that carries a particular irony, for it is following the election campaign that, for the first time, saw the three main party leaders pitted against each other in a series of presidential-style showdowns, that we are left with this almost equally unprecedented state of affairs.
The leaders' debates were supposed to provide the British public with the clearest opportunity yet to analyse every aspect of the candidates' suitability for the highest political office in the land – to determine who was the right man, the right statesman, to lead the country through the various challenges that lie ahead at home and abroad.
The debates had also always been predicted to be a boon for Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, but few predicted the public's response in the opinion polls – not only seen immediately after the first encounter on April 15, but sustained right up until the week of the election. The continuation of this trend, even as his counterparts belatedly began to turn the screw in the following debates, served to reinforce the sheer scale of the original impact.
So with the two-party habit of British electoral politics finally and decisively broken, perhaps we should have seen this denouement coming. The Conservatives were always facing an uphill battle to achieve the historic swing required to gain an overall majority, and with the Lib Dems strengthened in their very legitimacy like never before and even Labour finding its feet as it launched a renewed backlash against Tory policies, surely it was inevitable that the seats would be too evenly spread for any party to be 'first past the post'?
In the light of this, what do the election results mean for the legitimacy and stability of the new government? The inability of any party to take a decisive victory and the unwillingness of the Conservatives to attempt to go it alone have resulted in representatives from the country’s third most popular party sitting at the Cabinet table, co-governing according to a fresh 'manifesto' – the coalition agreement – that nobody voted for.
It is interesting, also, that one particular issue – voting reform – appeared to be the pivotal factor in 'sealing the deal' for a coalition government, even though it featured prominently only in the Lib Dems' campaign, a campaign that yielded just 23% of the popular vote. Having said that, one of the primary arguments in favour of the current system is that it delivers decisive majorities for the winning party – so perhaps it is no wonder that (notwithstanding a forthcoming referendum), a landmark change appears inevitable.
With such fundamental issues arising from them, the significance of the events of the past week is clear to see. Over the coming days, I will be reliving the events of the lead-up to and the aftermath of the election, taking a closer look at the results of last week’s vote, and also addressing some of the big issues and decisions facing this extraordinary new government.
It's a fundamental truth of coalition governments, one that many Western democracies have long since come to terms with, that politicians can spend weeks enthusiastically tearing into their rivals' policies and personalities, only to find themselves sharing power with those same foes within days. But in this country, whose politics is defined by, and renowned for, its adversarial nature, such a pattern of events seems truly remarkable.
Above all it's the timing of this outcome that carries a particular irony, for it is following the election campaign that, for the first time, saw the three main party leaders pitted against each other in a series of presidential-style showdowns, that we are left with this almost equally unprecedented state of affairs.
The leaders' debates were supposed to provide the British public with the clearest opportunity yet to analyse every aspect of the candidates' suitability for the highest political office in the land – to determine who was the right man, the right statesman, to lead the country through the various challenges that lie ahead at home and abroad.
The debates had also always been predicted to be a boon for Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, but few predicted the public's response in the opinion polls – not only seen immediately after the first encounter on April 15, but sustained right up until the week of the election. The continuation of this trend, even as his counterparts belatedly began to turn the screw in the following debates, served to reinforce the sheer scale of the original impact.
So with the two-party habit of British electoral politics finally and decisively broken, perhaps we should have seen this denouement coming. The Conservatives were always facing an uphill battle to achieve the historic swing required to gain an overall majority, and with the Lib Dems strengthened in their very legitimacy like never before and even Labour finding its feet as it launched a renewed backlash against Tory policies, surely it was inevitable that the seats would be too evenly spread for any party to be 'first past the post'?
In the light of this, what do the election results mean for the legitimacy and stability of the new government? The inability of any party to take a decisive victory and the unwillingness of the Conservatives to attempt to go it alone have resulted in representatives from the country’s third most popular party sitting at the Cabinet table, co-governing according to a fresh 'manifesto' – the coalition agreement – that nobody voted for.
It is interesting, also, that one particular issue – voting reform – appeared to be the pivotal factor in 'sealing the deal' for a coalition government, even though it featured prominently only in the Lib Dems' campaign, a campaign that yielded just 23% of the popular vote. Having said that, one of the primary arguments in favour of the current system is that it delivers decisive majorities for the winning party – so perhaps it is no wonder that (notwithstanding a forthcoming referendum), a landmark change appears inevitable.
With such fundamental issues arising from them, the significance of the events of the past week is clear to see. Over the coming days, I will be reliving the events of the lead-up to and the aftermath of the election, taking a closer look at the results of last week’s vote, and also addressing some of the big issues and decisions facing this extraordinary new government.
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